Chapter 15
The Case of the Conservative and Labour Parties and Brexit
Writing in the late 1990s, Christopher Anderson argued that the public looks to political elites for guidance in navigating the complex European Union (EU) issue as they consider them to have greater knowledge by virtue of their position of power (Anderson, 1998). Since then, however, the ability of political parties to influence public opinion has certainly decreased. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2005) show that public attitudes to membership of the European Union are shaped by three factors, namely a cost-benefit ‘calculation’, identity or ‘community’, and ‘cues’ received from the political elite. Testing over time, between 2004 and 2016, Harold Clarke et al. (2017) confirm that public opinion on integration continued to be determined by the three factors identified by Hooghe and Marks. The referendum on the United Kingdom (UK)’s continued membership of the European Union, held on 23 June 2016, presents an interesting case for the study of the top-down influence of political parties on public opinion regarding the EU. Almost 52% of those who voted supported Leave, while just over 48% supported Remain. Clarke et al. show that the most important factors in determining how the public voted were calculations of the costs and benefits of remaining in and leaving the EU, and questions of identity. While cueing by political elites was much less important, the positions of political elites nonetheless had some influence in shaping public opinion. While recognising the top-down influence of political parties on public opinion, Marco Steenbergen et al. (2007) find that the bottom-up influence of public opinion on party positions is generally greater. The 2016 referendum, as well as its aftermath, also provides an opportunity to study the bottom-up influence of public opinion on the positions of political parties and individual politicians.
The ability of parties to influence public opinion through cueing varies depending on certain factors, notably voter attachment to the party, the salience of the EU issue, and party unity (Ray, 2003). The more attached the public feels to a party, the more willing they are to heed the party’s cues. From a high of over 90% in the 1950s, the Conservative and Labour parties combined share of the vote reached a low of 65% at the 2010 general election. Falling support for the two main parties reflected a process of dealignment and increasing voter volatility (Cracknell et al., 2023, p. 7). A process of realignment began around 2010 as support for parties other than the Conservative and Labour parties grew (Cutts et al., 2020, p. 14).
The higher the salience of the EU issue, the greater the top-down influence of parties over public opinion. The long and difficult ratification of the Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992 during the premiership of John Major, caused an increase in the salience of the EU issue in political and public debate, and provided a platform for critics. With this increase in salience, support for integration began to decline. The salience of the EU issue, and opposition to membership, increased further following the Labour government’s decision not to hold a referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007. With the salience of the EU issue at a high, hard Eurosceptics seized the opportunity to build support for an in-out referendum.
A unified party is more able to influence public opinion. Having struggled with intra-party divisions during the Thatcher and Major years, the Conservative Party was relatively unified in its soft Euroscepticism while in opposition from 1997. However, following its return to government in 2010, divisions again came to the fore, this time between soft and hard Eurosceptics (Schnapper, 2014). The bottom-up influence of public and supporter opinion is particularly influential for divided parties as factions compete for dominance (Steenbergen et al., 2007). In contrast, having overcome deep intra-party divisions on the Europe issue, from the 1990s the Labour Party was unified in its support for integration, with only a small minority of its MPs calling into question EU membership.
This chapter seeks to better understand the flow of influence between the Conservative and Labour parties and the electorate at and following the 2016 referendum. To do so, it uses data gathered through a survey of, and interviews with, Conservative and Labour MPs around the time of the referendum, as well as polling data produced subsequently. Firstly, it analyses the flow of influence between political elites and the public in the run up to the referendum. Then it focuses on the flow of influence on Brexit and associated issues from the referendum to spring 2024.1 It is shown that a less attached, more volatile electorate was less subject to the top-down influence of the cues of political parties, notably those of the heavily divided Conservative Party, in advance of the referendum. In fact, public and supporter opinion seems to have influenced the positions of Conservative MPs on Brexit. The general elections held in 2017 and 2019, and the local elections of 2021, indicated a realignment of party support along Remain-Leave lines, based on parties’ positions on Brexit and associated issues. This realignment was to the electoral advantage of the Conservative Party, which attracted new supporters, and posed a major challenge for the Labour Party.
In January 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron promised that, if reelected at the next general election, his government would renegotiate the terms of the UK’s membership of the EU and then offer a referendum on continued membership. Having failed to quell mounting demands for a referendum from within the Conservative Party, Cameron made this promise in an attempt to avert ‘a full-blown civil war’ between soft and hard Eurosceptics (Evans, 2016). The Conservative and Labour 2015 general election manifestos set out the parties’ official positions on EU membership. The Conservative Party’s manifesto, which promised an in-out referendum, made little case for the benefits of EU membership. Rather, the focus was on the need for the EU to change. It was stated that the EU was ‘too big, too bossy and too bureaucratic’ and throughout the manifesto, immigration was presented as a burden. It was stated that UK was ‘too dependent on slow-growing European markets’, a promise was made to ‘control migration from the European Union’ and ‘curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights, so that foreign criminals can be more easily deported from Britain’ (Conservative Party, 2015). The Labour Party’s manifesto made no promise of a referendum unless further powers were to be transferred to the EU. Its tone was far more positive, highlighting the centrality of EU membership for the UK’s ‘prosperity and security’ and claimed that ‘the economic case for membership of the EU [was] overwhelming’. Nonetheless, a pledge was made to ‘work to change the EU’, with particular mention of immigration and social security rules (Labour Party, 2015). This promise to change the EU caused Labour’s messaging on the EU to be somewhat unclear.
Negotiations of the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU were concluded in February 2016. Claiming to be satisfied with the terms agreed, Cameron announced his support for Remain. Yet, Cameron had spent much of his political career seeking to convince his fellow Conservative MPs and Party members of his Euroscepticism. In light of this and having announced his support for Remain just four months before the referendum, Cameron struggled to make a positive and convincing case for membership. Rather, the arguments of Conservative Remainers focused on the dangers of leaving the EU and employed the rhetoric of fear (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 32). Cameron gave the Party’s MPs and cabinet ministers the right to campaign freely in advance of the referendum. Of the Conservatives’ 330 MPs, 187 – just 56% – supported Remain, 140 supported Leave, and three did not disclose their position (Lynch & Whitaker, 2018, p. 33). Within the government, seventeen ministers, of whom six were members of Cabinet, supported Leave (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 31), which served to reinforce the extent of the divide within the Party. The leadership’s credibility and the Party’s ability to cue public opinion were greatly compromised. The Labour Party, under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, officially supported Remain. The Party’s unity contrasted with the divisions within the Conservatives. Of the Party’s 234 MPs, 221 supported Remain, ten – less than 5% – supported Leave, and three did not disclose their position (Cygan et al., 2021). None of Labour’s Leavers held front-bench positions. Although the unity of the Party increased its ability to influence public opinion on EU membership, Corbyn struggled to make a coherent case for Remain, having long been a critic of many aspects of European integration.
A questionnaire of Conservative and Labour MPs completed in the months preceding the referendum provides detailed information on the attitudes of MPs towards European integration and EU membership (Polo Del Vecchio, 2021). Notably, this data provides clarity on whether the messaging of the Conservative and Labour parties and the official Remain and Leave campaigns reflected the views of individual MPs. The results of the questionnaire reflect the deep divide that was present within the Conservative Party on the Europe issue. The vast majority of Conservative MPs were either more supportive of, or more opposed to, EU membership than the Party leadership. Less than half of Conservative respondents felt attached to Europe and one third felt no attachment at all. More than 80% of Conservative respondents rated their support for EU membership and the benefits of membership for the UK at four out of ten or less, and the vast majority felt the process of European integration had gone too far. Other than the free movement of goods and services, support for specific EU policies was low within the Conservative Party. Conservative respondents highlighted loss of national sovereignty as the greatest drawback of EU membership, and immigration was considered to be one of the most important issues facing the UK. It is clear from the results of the questionnaire that, not only was the Party divided between Remain and Leave supporters, even Remain-supporting Conservative MPs, like the Party leader, would find it difficult to make a strong and positive case for staying in the EU.
The results of the questionnaire reflect the relative unity within the Labour Party in support of EU membership, with 72% of Labour MPs feeling that their personal views on the EU were in keeping with official Party policy. In contrast with their Conservative colleagues, 83% of Labour MPs felt attached to Europe, of which one third felt very attached; 80% of Labour respondents rated their support for EU membership at eight out of ten or more, and approximately 85% of Labour respondents evaluated the benefits for the UK of EU membership at seven out of ten or more. There was support for most EU policies among Labour respondents. Furthermore, the loss of national sovereignty was not perceived as a drawback of EU membership, and immigration was not viewed as a particularly important issue facing the UK. The results of the questionnaire reflect not only the unity within the Labour Party in support of EU membership, but also enthusiasm for the outcomes of integration. Although the questionnaire shows some Remain-supporting Labour MPs were unenthusiastic about European integration, they were a minority. These MPs tended to be on the left of the Party, and criticised certain outcomes of integration more than the process of transfers of sovereignty.
Britain Stronger in Europe and Vote Leave were designated the official campaigns by the Electoral Commission and the official campaign began on 15 April 2016. Britain Stronger in Europe was chaired not by a politician but by the businessman Stuart Rose. MPs from across the political spectrum, including the Conservative and Labour leaderships, joined the campaign. Given that the vast majority of Labour MPs supported Remain, their presence was greater than that of their Conservative counterparts. Bringing together a wide range of political actors as well as business actors and trade unionists, the official Remain campaign had the potential to appeal to a wide cross-section of the public. The campaign focused on the economic and, to a lesser extent, security aspects of EU membership (Britain Stronger in Europe, 2016). Yet, rather than emphasising the economic benefits of remaining in the EU, the campaign tended to focus on the negative economic consequences of leaving (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 59). This resulted in Leavers referring to the Remain campaign as ‘Project Fear’. Neither did the campaign make much reference to a common European identity. Given strong support for a range of EU policies and attachment to Europe expressed by Labour MPs in the questionnaire, it is striking that the Remain campaign, in which Labour MPs were prominent, did not seek to make a more positive case for EU membership. While this reflects differences within the broad membership of the campaign, it also indicates the reluctance of some Labour MPs to publicly express enthusiastic support for integration.
Like the official Remain campaign, Vote Leave gathered politicians from across the political spectrum. Yet, although the group was chaired by the Labour MP Gisela Stuart, politicians on the Right were prominent. Notably, six Conservative cabinet members, as well as Boris Johnson, who was Mayor of London until May 2016, played leading roles in the Leave campaign. Politicians were joined by business and other non-political actors. The campaign focused on questions of national sovereignty, immigration, and the UK’s contribution to the EU budget (Vote Leave, 2016). Given concerns among Conservative Leave-supporting MPs about national sovereignty and immigration, it is unsurprising that these issues were key features of the Leave campaign. Compared to the Remain campaign, the messaging of Vote Leave was more positive, with suggestions made for how money saved on budget contributions could be better spent and the possibilities that would be opened up by the return of decision-making powers to the UK (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 59). Yet the Leave campaign did make a number of negative claims against the EU, some of which were false. Moreover, the campaign sought to discredit expert opinion. During an interview on Sky News, the Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, claimed to ‘think the people of this country have had enough of experts from organisations with acronyms saying that they know what is best and getting it consistently wrong’ (Gove, 2016).
By the time the referendum campaign began in April 2016, a little more than two months before the referendum, the EU issue was of high salience. In theory, the heightened salience of the issue might have increased the top-down influence of political elites on public opinion. However, the question of EU membership was also a long-standing one on which the majority of the electorate had already established an opinion. The majority of both Remain (57%) and Leave (58%) voters decided how they would vote at least six months before the referendum (Ashcroft, 2016b). Furthermore, Matthew Goodwin et al. (2020) find that arguments in keeping with the prior beliefs of the electorate had a greater impact. The potential influence of the campaigns, and of parties in particular, therefore seemed to be limited.
At the time of the referendum, 28% of the electorate did not know whether the Conservative Party supported Remain or Leave, and 24% did not know the position of the Labour Party. There was relatively greater certainty regarding the position of the vocally anti-EU United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), with just 17% of the public unaware of the Party’s position (Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, 2016, p. 16). The two main parties played a limited role in determining the choice even of their supporters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Clarke et al. (2017, pp. 161–66) find that the divided Conservative Party had less impact on the choice of their supporters than did the unified Labour Party. Polling carried out on the day of the referendum revealed that 58% of those who had voted Conservative at the 2015 general election voted Leave whereas 37% of Labour supporters did so. However, while there was some correlation between party support and position on EU membership, the gap between the parties and their supporters was notable. This gap was particularly marked between Labour MPs and the Party’s supporters. Whereas 94% of Labour MPs supported Remain, just 63% of their supporters did, a gap of thirty-one percentage points. The gap between Conservative MPs and the Party’s supporters was much less, with 56% of Conservative MPs supporting Remain compared to 42% of supporters (Ashcroft, 2016b). However, 72% of Conservative Party members, who play a very important role in selecting the Party’s leader, voted Leave (Bale, 2019).
The work of Chris Hanretty (2017) on voting by constituency reveals a second gap, this time between MPs and their constituents. Whereas approximately three quarters of MPs supported Remain, it is estimated that 410 of 650 seats – 63% – voted Leave. Clarke et al. (2017, p. 150) show that nearly three quarters of Conservative-held seats voted Leave, yet just 44% of Conservative MPs supported Leave. The gap was even greater between Labour MPs and their constituents. Whereas approximately 64% of Labour-held seats voted Leave, less than 5% of Labour MPs did so. Consequently, 46% of Conservative MPs and 60% of Labour MPs were ‘out of step’ with their constituents. In some instances, the gap between MPs and their constituents was vast. For example, the Conservative MP for Boston and Skegness, Matt Warman, campaigned for Remain yet 75% of his constituents voted Leave. Likewise, 72% of constituents of Doncaster North voted Leave despite the vocal support of their MP, former Labour leader, Ed Miliband, for Remain.
Clarke et al. (2017, p. 161) show that the most significant factor in determining voting at the referendum was the electorate’s calculation of the costs and benefits of leaving the EU. In assessing the costs and benefits, the electorate would weigh up consequences for the economy and international influence, and consequences in terms of immigration and terrorism. In justifying their vote, both Conservative- and Labour-supporting Remain voters most frequently cited the risks for the economy of leaving the EU. A lesser proportion of Remain voters cited the benefits of access to the EU’s single market, and less than 10% referred to a strong attachment to the EU and its shared history, culture and traditions (Ashcroft, 2016b). These justifications reflect the Remain campaign’s focus on the economic costs of leaving the EU and the absence of an affective dimension in the Remain campaign, despite the fact that many Remain-supporting MPs, notably Labour members, felt a strong sense of European identity.
Both Conservative- and Labour-supporting Leave voters most frequently cited the desire to see decisions about the UK being made in the UK. Identity factors, notably concerns about immigration control, were also frequently cited by both Conservative and Labour supporters (Ashcroft, 2016b). Again, these justifications reflect the focus of the Leave campaign on the benefits of reclaiming national sovereignty and border control. Polling carried out in December 2015 showed that for over 70% of the electorate immigration was the most important issue facing the UK, and concerns about immigration were much higher among those who intended to vote Leave than among those who intended to vote Remain (YouGov Tracker 1). The decision of the Leave campaign to respond to public opinion and make immigration control a key argument therefore served to boost its appeal. The electorate viewed the Leave campaign as more honest, positive and clear than the Remain campaign (YouGov/The Times, 2016), which undoubtedly served to boost the Leave campaign’s influence over public opinion.
In fact, it has been shown that perceptions of immigration had the most impact in determining how the electorate voted at the referendum. Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford (2020) find that the principle dividing line between Remain and Leave voters was identification as either an identity liberal or an identity conservative. Whereas the former feel quite comfortable with societal changes and tended to support Remain, the latter view such changes, in particular immigration, as a threat and tended to support Leave. A related divide, emphasised by Sara Hobolt (2016) as a driver of Brexit voting, is that between the winners and losers of globalisation. We can talk of areas thriving in a context of globalisation and those in decline or ‘left-behind’. The extent to which an area has been ‘left behind’ is measured not just by economic deprivation but also in terms of social conservatism. It is among identity conservatives in left-behind areas that support for Leave was highest. It is also among this section of the electorate that the decrease in partisan attachment and the increase in voter volatility has been most marked, limiting the top-down influence of political parties. While, on the whole, the perceptions of Labour supporters of immigration were more positive than those of Conservative supporters (47% vs 27% positive perceptions), the perceptions of Leave-voting Labour supporters were almost as negative as those of Leave-voting Conservative supporters (19% vs 14% positive perceptions) (Ashcroft, 2016a, pp. 168–70). Although the Labour leadership was aware of concerns about immigration among the general public and their supporters – hence their 2015 manifesto promise to address immigration and social security rules – they vastly underestimated the power of this issue in determining voting at the referendum. The Labour Party’s messaging was therefore out of touch with the key concerns of a section of their supporters, notably in the traditionally Labour-held ‘red-wall’ seats in the Midlands and Northern England. Despite the unity of the Labour Party, its ability to influence the opinion of its traditional supporters was compromised, allowing for the Leave campaign to gain ground.
Among political elites, it was the leading figures of the Remain and Leave campaigns that had the greatest influence in determining voter choice. Polling by ComRes shows that, within the Remain campaign, Conservative and Labour Party leaders, David Cameron and Jeremy Corbyn, were the most influential. Cameron succeeded in influencing not only Remain supporters, but also undecided voters. Furthermore, he had some influence over voters who had supported Labour at the 2015 general election as well as Conservative supporters, and his reach spanned age groups. The scope of Corbyn’s influence was more limited than that of Cameron. He influenced principally Remain supporters and those who had voted Labour at the previous general election. His influence also tended to be limited to younger voters. The polling data shows that Conservative MP, Boris Johnson, and the UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, were the most influential actors of the Leave campaign. Like Cameron, Johnson had widespread influence. He succeeded in influencing Leave supporters and some undecided voters of various age groups. Farage was most successful in influencing older Leave supporters who had voted for UKIP at the previous general election (ComRes, 2016, p. 25). Key in determining the influence of leading figures was how ‘likeable’ the electorate considered them to be, with more likeable figures having more influence. Given his relative popularity among the public at the time, Boris Johnson was particularly influential (Clarke et al., 2017).
The presence of Johnson as a leading figure was a great asset for the Leave campaign. Yet, his decision to support Brexit also served his personal career objectives. The perception among Conservative MPs interviewed shortly before the referendum was that, regardless of the outcome, the next Party leader would have to have supported Leave in order to win the support of the Parliamentary Party and Party members.2 Conservative Party members play a key role in electing the leader and the vast majority supported Leave. For some of his Conservative colleagues, strategic calculations rather than ideology drove Johnson’s decision to campaign for Leave.3 The bottom-up influence of public opinion, and notably of Conservative Party members and supporters, clearly influenced Johnson’s position at the referendum. He wanted to back the winning horse and rightly bet that Leave, with his help, would win. The public exposure and support he gained during the referendum campaign helped Johnson to become the most popular choice among Leave supporters to be the next Prime Minister (ComRes, 2016, p. 55).
It seems that the desire for political gain influenced other Conservative MPs in positioning themselves on EU membership. During an interview, Conservative MP Flick Drummond spoke about the ‘pressure from Conservative Party members’ causing candidates and MPs, especially those without a strong majority, to adopt more Eurosceptic positions (Drummond, 2016). Drummond’s Conservative colleague, John Howell, noted that there was a ‘strong fear among Conservative politicians of being labelled Europhile’ (Howell, 2016). Furthermore, almost three quarters of Conservative respondents to the questionnaire carried out in the months preceding the referendum believed that their constituents opposed EU membership. Given perceptions of the opinion of members, constituents and the public, it is likely that Conservative MPs, especially those with a narrow majority, were susceptible to bottom-up influence in positioning themselves on EU membership. In line with Steenbergen et al. (2007), the presence of deep divisions within the Conservative Party served to boost the bottom-up influence of public and supporter opinion and thus weaken the ability of the Party to cue public opinion.
In contrast to Conservative MPs, almost 90% of Labour respondents to the questionnaire believed that the majority of their constituents supported EU membership. Given that approximately two thirds of Labour-held seats voted Leave (Hanretty, 2017), many Labour MPs misread the views of their constituents. Yet, believing their positions were in keeping with the opinion of their constituents, and given the unity of the Labour Party on the question of membership, Labour MPs were less susceptible to bottom-up influence in positioning themselves in advance of the referendum. However, although the relatively unified Labour Party was better placed to cue public opinion, the considerable gap between Labour MPs and their constituents and the general electorate, as well as unclear messaging from the leadership, limited the Party’s influence.
The referendum result reflected, but also served to accelerate, the ongoing process of the dealignment of UK politics which has seen voters become less loyal to the two main parties and more willing to switch parties. A process of realignment had been underway since 2010 as support for parties such as UKIP grew. If the realignment could be pursued along Brexit lines, the Conservative Party, whose MPs had shown themselves to be more in step with the concerns of Leave voters, stood to make considerable political gains (Cutts et al., 2020).
It is therefore surprising that Theresa May, who had supported Remain, albeit discretely, succeeded David Cameron as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister following the latter’s resignation after the referendum. May was elected by the Parliamentary Party alone, avoiding a vote by Leave-supporting Party members. Viewed with suspicion by Leave supporters, May sought to reassure them by making clear her respect for the outcome of the referendum and appointing key Leave figures to Cabinet, most notably Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary. David Davis, who played a prominent role in the Leave campaign, was appointed Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. At the vote held in February 2017 to invoke Article 50 and formally notify the UK’s intention to leave the EU, just one Conservative MP, veteran Europhile, Kenneth Clarke, rebelled (Hansard, 2017). The intra-party consensus on the principle of the UK’s departure from the EU indicated that Remain-voting Conservative MPs had taken heed of public and supporter opinion. It seemed as though the referendum had, as hoped, allowed for a return to unity within the Conservative Party.
Following the referendum, the Labour leader, Corbyn, faced criticism from within the Parliamentary Party for his performance during the campaign. The resignation of members of the Shadow Cabinet and a vote of no confidence provoked a leadership challenge. The contest pitched Corbyn, who pledged to respect the result of the referendum, against Shadow Cabinet member Owen Smith, who promised to push for a second referendum. The Labour Party’s leadership election process gives members a much greater say than MPs over the choice of leader. Corbyn was reelected enjoying the support of the majority of Party members, but not of Labour MPs. His leadership was weak and intra-party divisions on Brexit were evident at the vote to invoke Article 50, at which forty-seven – 20% – of Labour’s MPs, including a number of frontbenchers, rebelled to oppose notification (Hansard, 2017). Of the forty-seven rebels, forty represented constituencies that voted Remain, some by over 80%. The bottom-up influence of constituents’ preferences seemed to influence MPs’ positions. Just seven of the rebels were ‘out of step’ with their Leave-voting constituents (Hanretty, 2016).
May’s decision to hold a snap general election in June 2017 forced parties to take a stance on Brexit. The manifestos of both the Conservative and Labour parties pledged to respect the result of the referendum and negotiate a deal that would prioritise the national interest. However, whereas the Conservative manifesto emphasised the need for a ‘strong and stable government’ to negotiate Brexit and promised to ‘reduce and control immigration’ (Conservative Party, 2017), the Labour manifesto pledged to maintain links with the EU and ensure ‘reasonable management of migration’ (Labour Party, 2017). The previous general election held in 2015 had essentially been fought along a single left-right dimension. Two years later, the EU issue was of much greater importance, with 28% of voters considering it to be the most important issue of the election (Ashcroft, 2017). Brexit identity – identification as either a Remainer or a Leaver – and sociocultural issues played an important role in determining how the electorate voted, and Hooghe and Marks (2018) describe the emergence of a new cleavage based on attitudes towards European integration and immigration.
Over two thirds (68%) of those who voted Conservative at the 2017 general election had voted Leave the previous year. Furthermore, for almost half (48%) of Conservative voters Brexit was the most important issue in determining how they voted. Of those who voted Leave in 2016, 60% voted Conservative in 2017. Just 25% of Remain supporters voted for the Conservatives. The Party benefitted from the collapse in support for UKIP, attracting the vote of 57% of those who voted UKIP at the previous general election. Voting patterns showed the Conservatives to be the party of Leave supporters. In contrast, almost two thirds (64%) of those who voted Labour had voted Remain at the referendum. The National Health Service (NHS) was the most important issue in determining how they voted and Brexit was of limited importance, with just 8% of Labour voters considering it to be the most important issue. This suggested an acceptance of the prospect of leaving the EU even among Labour supporters who had voted Remain. While the Labour Party was more attractive to Remainers than Leavers, it was not so clearly the party of Remain as just 51% of those who had voted Remain voted Labour in 2017 (Ashcroft, 2017). Nonetheless, the outcome of the election suggested a certain realignment of political support along Remain-Leave lines. Although the perceived importance of immigration fell substantially in the year following the referendum, the correlation between Brexit identity and the importance of immigration in determining how the electorate voted was still present, with 58% of Leavers and just 16% of Remainers considering the issue to be the most important one facing the UK. The correlation extended to party support, with 48% of Conservative voters and just 18% of Labour voters viewing immigration as the most important issue (YouGov Tracker 1). This correlation indicated that the realignment of political support was based both on parties’ positions on Brexit and the associated identity politics issue of immigration.
The general election saw net losses for the Conservative Party and gains for the Labour Party, and resulted in a hung parliament. While the Conservatives gained votes in Leave-voting constituencies, aided by the collapse in support for UKIP following the referendum, they lost support in Remain-voting constituencies. In contrast, Labour gained votes in Remain-voting constituencies and lost support in constituencies that voted heavily in favour of Leave. Although the Conservative Party gained twelve Scottish National Party (SNP)-held seats in Remain-voting Scotland, mostly due to opposition to a second independence referendum, the Conservatives won six seats from Labour in England. Located in the Labour heartland of the North and the Midlands, all of these constituencies voted Leave by more than 62%. The Labour Party won twenty-eight Conservative-held seats. Although fifteen of these constituencies voted Leave, they did so by less than 55%. The thirteen Remain-voting constituencies won by Labour from the Conservatives had voted heavily in favour of Remain. The Conservatives lost a further four Remain-voting seats to the Liberal Democrats. The realignment of support along Brexit lines was marked enough to allow for seats to be won or lost on this basis. Although the Conservative Party lost seats at the 2017 general election, it stood to gain from a sustained and more pronounced realignment along Brexit lines as the support of Remain voters was shared among a number of parties (Apostolova et al., 2019; Hanretty, 2016).
Conservative MPs who had supported Remain and represented Leave-voting seats were not punished by their constituents at the 2017 general election. In fact, most saw their majority increase. Not even the seven Labour MPs who were ‘out of step’ with their constituents in opposing the invoking of Article 50 were punished at the general election. Like their Conservative colleagues, most maintained or even increased their majority (Apostolova et al., 2019; Hanretty, 2016). This suggests that, where the Brexit issue was important in determining voting choice, the positions of parties rather than constituency candidates mattered.
Despite the show of intra-party unity at the February 2017 vote, there were divisions within the Conservative Party as to the terms and conditions of Brexit. The loss of the Party’s majority at the general election was a source of anger and served to bring these divisions back to the fore (Hayton, 2018). With the Party divided and dependent on the support of the Democratic Unionist Party, May’s leadership was weak and the likelihood of rebellion increased. Johnson’s resignation as Foreign Secretary in July 2018, along with that of David Davis, in protest at the Withdrawal Agreement that May had negotiated with the EU, further weakened the Prime Minister’s leadership and deepened divisions within the Party. From the backbenches, Johnson led opposition to May’s Brexit policy and the ideological shift within the Party towards the hard Brexit that Party members and supporters wanted. Susceptible to bottom-up influence, he built on his popularity among members and the growing number of hard Brexiters within the Parliamentary Party, with a view to a future bid for the Party leadership. Intra-party divisions and Johnson’s influence were evidenced by the rebellion of Conservative hard Brexiters, led by Johnson, at the first and second ‘Meaningful Votes’ held in January and March 2019 on the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by the Prime Minister.
The result of the 2017 general election indicated that the Labour Party’s policy of ‘constructive ambiguity’ towards Brexit had been a success (Diamond, 2018). The policy appeared to have retained the support of many Remain voters while minimising the loss of support among Leave voters. The Party’s gains, under the leadership of Corbyn, helped to consolidate his leadership. Following the election, the Labour Party began to promote a softer approach to Brexit, pushing notably for membership of the EU’s Customs Union. This policy, led by Keir Starmer as Shadow Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, was more in keeping with the views of the Party’s MPs and members, as well as the majority of those who had voted Labour at the 2017 general election, and served to unify the Party. In contrast to the heavily divided Conservative Party, Labour was highly unified in voting against the government’s Brexit policy at the three ‘Meaningful Votes’ held in early 2019 (Aidt et al., 2021).
In light of her failure to gain parliamentary support for her Withdrawal Agreement, and following disappointing results for the Conservative Party at both the local and European Parliament elections held in May 2019, May announced her resignation. Johnson succeeded May, winning all five ballots of Conservative MPs and the support of two thirds of Party members. He therefore enjoyed a strong mandate from the Party to pursue his preferred Brexit. Johnson placed Brexit at the core of his statecraft and used the issue to build the politics of support in an attempt to restore Conservative electoral dominance. Hard Brexiters were predominant in Johnson’s Cabinet and all members were required to sign a pledge in support of Brexit, even without a deal (Hayton, 2021a; 2021b). Johnson made it clear that neither would he tolerate dissent on the backbenches and, in September 2019, expelled twenty-one Conservative MPs who rebelled in an attempt to ensure the UK would not leave the EU without a deal. An additional twenty-six Remain-voting Conservative MPs announced that they would not seek reelection. The ‘externalisation’ of critics of the government’s Brexit policy marked a turning point for the broad-church Conservative Party, which had until then sought to include, or ‘internalise’, a diversity of views. Externalising dissidents shifted the ideological balance within the Party towards support for hard Brexit and ensured intra-party unity in advance of the general election Johnson called for December 2019.
The Conservative Party manifesto, entitled Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain’s Potential, made Brexit the most important issue of the election. The Party pledged to ‘get Brexit done in January 2020’ and introduce an ‘Australian-style points-based system to control immigration’ (Conservative Party, 2019). In marked contrast to its position at the 2017 general election, the Labour Party manifesto pledged to put a ‘sensible deal’ to ‘a public vote alongside the option to remain’ (Labour Party, 2019). The two-dimensional competition that had been a characteristic of the previous general election was again a feature in 2019, and the Brexit issue was key in determining how the electorate voted (Fieldhouse et al., 2023).
The ‘tribal’ identification of the electorate as either Remainers or Leavers seems to have been even more important in determining voting choices at the 2019 general election than in 2017, reflecting a key impact of Brexit on the UK’s party system (Baldini et al., 2021). With the electorate ever more volatile, Brexit identity was more important than party identity, and by late 2019 more than 80% of Labour supporters were Remain voters and more than 80% of Conservative supporters were Leave voters (Fieldhouse et al., 2023). Despite low levels of party attachment, the unity of Conservative MPs in support for Brexit and the high salience of Brexit for the Party helped it to drive public opinion on the issue. Even more so than at the 2017 general election, the Conservative Party was the party of Leave. In 2019, the Party attracted the support of 73% of Leave voters, up from 60% in 2017, and just 20% of Remain voters, down from 25% in 2017. While the Conservatives were successful in attracting the support of 25% of Leavers who had voted Labour in 2017, it lost 21% of its Remain-voting 2017 supporters to the Liberal Democrats. For 72% of Conservative voters, getting Brexit done was one of the three most important issues in determining how they voted. Just 47% of Remain voters supported Labour and the Party lost almost 10% of its Remain-voting 2017 supporters to the Liberal Democrats.
The Labour Party was therefore less the party of Remain than it had been in 2017. Not only did the Party lose more Leave voters to the Conservative Party, it lost 9% of its Remain-voting 2017 supporters to the Liberal Democrats. For 74% of Labour voters, the NHS was one of the three most important issues, although stopping Brexit was important for 28% of its supporters. As at the 2017 general election, in 2019 Brexit was less important for Labour voters, with many having accepted the prospect of leaving the EU. Nonetheless, a considerable proportion of supporters continued to strongly oppose the government’s hardline Brexit policy. Immigration was less important to the electorate than it had been both at the time of the referendum and at the 2017 general election (Ashcroft, 2019). Nonetheless, there was again a correlation between Brexit identity and the perceived importance of immigration. Whereas 38% of Leave voters considered immigration to be the most important issue facing the UK, just 7% of Remain voters considered this to be the case. Again, the correlation extended to party support, with 32% of Conservative supporters and just 12% of Labour supporters considering immigration to be the most important issue facing the UK (YouGov Tracker 1). This served to confirm the realignment of political support along the Brexit-identity politics divide. For Labour, finding a position that would allow it to retain the support of those most opposed to Brexit while encouraging the return of identity conservative former Labour supporters had proved elusive.
The gains made by the Conservative Party allowed it to secure a significant parliamentary majority. In contrast, the Labour Party suffered its fourth successive defeat and its greatest loss since 1935. The Party lost sixty – more than 20% – of its seats, fifty-four of them to the Conservatives (Menon, 2021). The success of the Conservative Party in establishing itself as the party of Brexit was clear as it won 294 of the 410 Leave-voting constituencies. While the Labour Party secured seats in Remain-voting metropoles, this was not enough to counter the Conservatives’ gains in Leave-voting constituencies. Notably, the Conservatives won thirty of the forty-two so-called ‘red-wall’ seats situated in the North and the Midlands (Kanagasooriam & Simon, 2021). These seats are traditionally Labour-held, low-income constituencies, and the vast majority voted heavily for Leave. The ability of the Labour Party to influence its traditional supporters in these areas had clearly greatly diminished. Instead, Johnson’s campaign pledge to ‘get Brexit done’ was a pull factor, attracting ‘identity-conservative’ Labour Leave voters (Ford et al., 2021). Johnson’s strategy of exploiting the divide between identity and value groups was successful (Surridge, 2021). Intra-party unity and clarity on the key electoral topics of Brexit and associated identity politics issues allowed for stronger top-down messaging by the Conservative Party and thus the continued realignment of support along Brexit lines to the benefit of the Conservatives. In contrast, the Labour Party was hindered by a lack of clarity on these key topics, as well as by the growing unpopularity of Corbyn.
Conservative Remainer MPs who had left the Party, either by choice or following their expulsion, and ran as candidates for another party, lost their seat to the Conservative candidate. In contrast, as in 2017, Conservative MPs who had supported Remain at the referendum but had subsequently fallen into line with the government’s policy were rewarded with reelection. Furthermore, most of the Conservative MPs elected for the first time in 2019 had voted Leave. As a result, the intra-party ideological unity on the Brexit issue was reinforced. Labour MPs were seemingly punished for the Party’s position on Brexit. On the one hand, the Party’s position on Brexit did not go far enough to prevent some Remain-voting former supporters switching to the Liberal Democrats. On the other hand, the Party’s pledge to offer the possibility to remain in the EU caused many Leave-voting former supporters to vote Conservative, most notably in ‘red-wall’ seats. Such was the shift in support in Labour heartlands that Denis Skinner, who had been the MP for Bolsover since 1970 and had voted Leave in line with his constituents, lost his seat to the Conservative candidate. Corbyn resigned as Labour leader following the general election. He was succeeded by Starmer who was more openly Europhile than his predecessor. It was Starmer, as shadow Brexit Secretary, who had pushed for the Labour leadership to offer the possibility of a second vote on Brexit and argued for a return of the free movement of EU workers during the leadership campaign (Stewart, 2019; 2020).
There are considerable socioeconomic differences between traditional Conservative voters and those who voted for the Party for the first time in 2019. New supporters were more likely than traditional supporters to hold working-class occupations and identify as working class. Furthermore, new supporters were less likely to own their own home (Surridge, 2022). The challenge for the Conservative Party would therefore be to hold on to the support of both traditional and new supporters despite their differing economic preferences. Given the importance of ‘getting Brexit done’ in driving support for the Conservatives in 2019, the government could hope to retain the approval of its electors so long as Brexit remained high on the political agenda (Baldini et al., 2021), which it did throughout 2020, despite the Covid-19 pandemic. Thanks to the strong parliamentary majority and unity of the Conservative Party, the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill was passed within a month of the general election. The Brexit issue continued to be of heightened salience as the government negotiated the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU. A deal was finalised and adopted by Parliament before the transition period came to an end on 31 December 2020. Johnson had kept his promise to ‘get Brexit done’.
The importance for the electorate of the UK leaving the EU declined markedly from 2021 (YouGov Tracker 1). Likewise, although two thirds of the electorate continued to identify either as a Remainer or a Leaver, the prevalence of Brexit identity declined (Tilley & Hobolt, 2023). While the Brexit issue decreased in salience, the perceived importance of immigration increased following the 2019 general election. By spring 2021, over 40% of Leave voters considered immigration to be the most important issue facing the UK, more important than the economy and health (YouGov Tracker 1). It was in this context that Starmer reversed Labour’s commitment to the free movement of people (Sparrow, 2021). This policy change seemed to be a direct response to the bottom-up pressure of public opinion, including that of former-Labour supporters. Despite the change in Labour’s policy, the result of local elections held in May 2021 seemed to confirm the ongoing realignment of UK politics along Remain-Leave lines and indicated that the Conservative Party continued to benefit from the support of its new Leave-supporting voters. The Conservatives made considerable gains, notably in Leave-voting areas, whereas support for the Party fell sharply in Remain-voting areas, where a swing towards the Liberal Democrats could be observed. Support for the Labour Party fell most in wards that voted heavily for Leave, although it did not rise in Remain-voting areas (Curtice, 2021). The result of the local elections can be seen as a signal of approval not only of the government’s handling of Brexit but also of its stance on the identity-politics issue of immigration.
A marked change in public perceptions of Brexit took place from early 2022 as it became clear that the deal negotiated by Johnson in late 2020 was flawed. An increasing proportion of the public came to believe that the decision to leave the EU was wrong. Since summer 2022, the majority of the public has considered the decision to leave the EU to be a mistake (What UK Thinks Tracker). Even among Leave voters, there is a growing perception that Brexit has not been a success. Leave voters are more likely than not to believe that Brexit has had a bad impact on the economy and has worsened border control and immigration (Curtice, 2023a). Net migration has increased steeply since mid-2021, with a particularly marked increase in the number of people crossing the English Channel in small boats (Sturge, 2024; Walsh & Cuibus, 2025). The growing perception among Leave voters that Brexit has not been a success, particularly in terms of controlling immigration, might well serve to halt the post-referendum realignment along Brexit lines.
Growing dissatisfaction was reflected in the poor result for the Conservative Party at the May 2022 local elections. Although the ‘partygate’ scandal engulfing the Conservatives at the time undoubtedly contributed to the result, the swing of support from the Conservatives to Labour compared to 2021 was greatest among Leave voters and in Leave-voting wards, which indicated the Conservative Party could no longer count so heavily on the support of Leave voters (Curtice, 2022). The poor election result for the Conservative Party contributed to the growing sense within the Party that Johnson had become an electoral liability rather than an asset, and the Prime Minister announced his resignation in July 2022. In contrast, Starmer, boosted by the result of the local elections, announced Labour’s plan to ‘make Brexit work’, which explicitly ruled out the possibility of rejoining the EU’s single market (Starmer, 2022). Rather than calling into question the decision to leave the EU, the announcement was critical of the government’s handling of Brexit and responded directly to public perceptions that Brexit had not delivered. Notably, Labour’s position reflected the bottom-up influence of the Party’s traditional voters, whose support would have to be regained to ensure a victory at the next general election.
As the salience of the Brexit issue decreased, and in light of the cost of living crisis, the importance of the economy increased markedly for the electorate (YouGov Tracker 1). The changed priorities of the electorate could signal a return to one-dimensional voting along the left-right spectrum. Voting based principally on economic policies would be to the disadvantage of the Conservative Party as, between September 2022 and spring 2024, polling showed that the general electorate believed the Labour Party would be best at handling the economy. Although Leave voters had more confidence in the ability of the Conservative Party to manage the economy, their confidence decreased considerably following the 2019 general election (YouGov Tracker 2). This situation created a strong incentive for the Conservative Party to continue to push social values issues, notably immigration, up the agenda.
Rishi Sunak was appointed Prime Minister in October 2022 following the brief and turbulent premiership of Liz Truss. Truss’s premiership coincided with a drastic decline in support for the Conservative Party, from which the Party has never recovered (YouGov Tracker 3). In December 2022, Sunak made a statement to Parliament addressing the issue of migrants crossing the English Channel in small boats, which he referred to as ‘illegal immigration’ (Sunak, 2022), and he made stopping such crossings one of his government’s five key priorities for 2023 (Sunak, 2023). Central to this objective was the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which provides for the detention and removal of migrants who arrive in the UK unlawfully. By the time of the May 2023 local elections, the importance of immigration for the general electorate had increased further. For both Conservative supporters and Leave voters, immigration was the second most important issue, and only slightly less important than the economy (YouGov Tracker 1). However, despite efforts to respond to public opinion and reassure the electorate that steps were being taken to reduce immigration, the Conservative Party again lost seats at the 2023 local elections. Furthermore, as at the local elections held the previous year, support for the Party fell most in wards that had voted heavily for Leave (Curtice, 2023b). The realignment of party support along Brexit lines seemed to have halted.
The government’s statements on immigration appear to have driven the perception among 2019 Conservative supporters and Leave voters that the issue was of the upmost importance. However, its policy measures did not succeed in halting the dramatic increase in the number of immigrants arriving in the UK post-Brexit. As a result, despite keeping the immigration issue at the top of the political agenda, the Conservative Party was not able to retain the support of Leave voters. In fact, as the importance of the immigration issue increased, support for Reform UK (formerly UKIP and then the Brexit Party) grew. The Conservative Party manifesto was published on 11 June 2024. In light of a recent slight decrease in the rate of inflation, the Party sought to take credit for an apparent improvement in the UK’s economic situation and the manifesto called on the electorate to vote Conservative so as to ‘stick to [the] plan’. Nonetheless, the manifesto emphasised the Conservatives’ tough approach to immigration. The Party pledged to ‘stop the boats by removing illegal migrants to Rwanda’ and ‘rewrite asylum treaties’, and also to tighten the conditions on legal immigration so as to reduce numbers (Conservative Party, 2024, p. 36). The Labour Party manifesto, published on 13 June 2024, focused on the issues typical of one-dimensional voting along the left-right spectrum. It was nonetheless stated: ‘With Labour, Britain will stay outside the EU’ (Labour Party, 2024, p. 117).
In seeking to cue public opinion in advance of the 2016 referendum on continued UK membership of the EU, the influence of both the Conservative and Labour parties was limited by reduced voter attachment. The influence of the Conservatives was further reduced by deep intra-party divisions and the Party’s MPs were more susceptible to the bottom-up influence of public opinion. Although Labour was more unified and thus more able to influence public opinion, its messaging was unclear and the positions of its MPs were markedly out of step with public opinion and that of Party supporters and constituents.
The outcome of the referendum revealed a society divided into Remainers and Leavers. This Brexit divide correlates with pre-existing divisions between identity liberals and identity conservatives based on attitudes towards societal changes, notably immigration, and between those who have benefitted from globalisation and those it has left behind. Following a long period of dealignment, the post-referendum period saw a realignment of party support. Having shown itself to be more in step with public opinion at and following the 2016 referendum, and finally unified on the Europe issue from 2019, the Conservative Party made political gains by responding to the bottom-up influence of public opinion and positioning as the party of Brexit and immigration control. So long as the Brexit and immigration issues were of high salience, the Party succeeded in retaining the support of voters with quite different economic interests. In contrast, the Labour Party struggled to find a position that would allow it to satisfy both identity liberal Remainers and identity conservative Leavers who had supported the Party until the referendum. It was only once the electoral importance of the Brexit issue declined and the salience of economic issues increased relative to immigration that the realignment of support along the Brexit-identity politics divide was halted.
Bianca Polo Del Vecchio
Keywords: European integration, political elites, party cues, public opinion, influence, Brexit
Public attitudes towards European integration are determined by a ‘calculation’ of the costs and benefits of membership, identity or ‘community’, and ‘cues’ received from political elites. The influence of a party’s cues varies depending on voter attachment to the party, the salience of the EU issue, and party unity. The 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum and its aftermath present an interesting case for the study of the top-down influence of political elites on public opinion on EU membership as well as the bottom-up influence of public opinion on the positions of political parties and individual politicians. Party cues, especially those of the heavily divided Conservative Party, had little impact on voting at the referendum. Furthermore, in a context of heightened voter volatility and the dealignment and realignment of political support, public opinion was key in determining the positions of parties and politicians following the referendum.